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Abstract
This paper provides the first serious attempt to examine the relationship between
political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing countries. The
outcomes of the analysis show that in most cases political risk variables do have
a statistically robust relationship to capital flight once domestic and international
macroeconomic circumstances are added, at least when the robustness test as
proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997) is applied. We conclude that on the basis of
the analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political
risk leads to increased capital flight.
* Please, send all your comments to Robert Lensink, Department of Economics, University of
Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV, Groningen, the Netherlands, email <b.w.lensink@eco.rug.nl>.
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1. Introduction
The capital flight problem has been examined quite extensively in the literature.
In addition to discussing the concept and measurement of capital flight1, several
studies have investigated the determinants of the phenomenon. The studies
emphasize the factors that determine capital flight, in terms of the impact of
these factors on the domestic "investment climate" (Pastor, 1990, p.7). The
stylized argument is that residents decide to invest their wealth abroad due to an
adverse domestic investment climate, or because economic agents consider it too
risky to invest domestically. According to this argument, variables that have
been found to cause capital flight include overvalued exchange rates, high
domestic inflation rates, government budget deficits, the domestic versus the
international interest rate differential, and capital inflows. Thus, these variables
measure the economic aspects of an adverse domestic investment climate.
Many observers suggest that political instability and uncertainty are
particularly important in explaining the flight of capital: residents faced with
such instability and uncertainty take their money and run to avoid the possibility
that the government may in one way or another erode the future value of their
asset holdings. What is amazing, therefore, is that in the literature on capital
flight there has been no systematic investigation of the impact of political factors
on the extent of the capital flight phenomenon. This paper aims to fill this gap in
the literature. It makes use of data sets available for political variables to
investigate the relationship between capital flight and political instability and
uncertainty in developing countries. The paper makes one important additional
contribution: it is the first attempt to analyse the determinants of capital flight
for a large set of developing countries. All other empirical studies investigate the
issue for individual countries (Cuddington, 1986, for Mexico, Venezuela and
Argentina; Mikkelsen, 1991, for Mexico; Vos, 1990, for the Philippines), or for
certain groups or regions of countries (Pastor, 1990, and Ketkar and Ketkar,
1989, for Latin America; Mikkelsen, 1991, for a set of 22 developing countries;
1 See World Bank (1985), Dooley (1986), Deppler and Williamson (1987) and Claessens and
Naudé (1993) to mention a few examples.
1
Hermes and Lensink, 1992 and Murinde, Hermes and Lensink, 1996, for Sub-
Saharan African countries; and Hermes, Lensink and Murinde, 1998, for Eastern
European countries).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of
the concept and measurement of capital flight. Section 3 presents summary
statistics on the magnitude of capital flight for developing countries. Section 4
gives the main estimation results of the determinants of capital flight of
developing countries. Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions.
2. Measurement of Capital Flight
Capital flight is a rather slippery concept: several interpretations have been given
of what exactly is meant by the term. Usually, capital flight is related to the
existence of high uncertainty and risk with respect to returns on domestically
held assets. Residents take their money and run in order to avoid extremely high
expected losses on their asset holdings. It is sometimes argued that capital
outflows based on these considerations should be viewed as abnormal, and
should therefore be distinguished from normal capital outflows, since normal
outflows are based on considerations of portfolio diversification of residents,
and/or activities of domestic commercial banks aiming at acquiring or extending
foreign deposit holdings (Deppler and Williamson, 1987, p.41). Yet, when
measuring capital flight it appears to be very difficult to empirically distinguish
between normal and abnormal capital outflows.
It may come, therefore, as no surprise that several different capital flight
measures are available in the existing literature. Inevitably, these measures lead
to differences in capital flight estimates. However, the following three main
methods of measuring capital flight can be distinguished in the literature. First,
several studies measure capital flight indirectly from balance of payments
statistics by comparing the sources of capital inflows (i.e. net increases in
external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment) with the uses of these
inflows (i.e. the current account deficit and additions to foreign reserves). If the
sources exceed the uses of capital inflows, the difference is termed as capital
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flight. This is the so-called residual method. It has been the most widely used
measure in the available literature. The method acknowledges the difficulties of
separating abnormal from normal capital outflows and, therefore, measures all
private capital outflows as being capital flight. Several variations on the measure
have appeared in the literature, among them World Bank (1985), Morgan
Guaranty (1986) and Cline (1987).2
Second, some authors measure capital flight by adding up net errors and
omissions and non-bank private short-term capital outflows (Cuddington, 1986;
Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993). This measure reflects the idea that capital flight
goes unrecorded, due to the illegal nature of these capital movements. It is
argued that the unrecorded capital movements appear in the net errors and
omissions. Moreover, by concentrating on short-term flows, medium- and long-
term outflows are excluded, which according to these authors are more normal
in character (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993, p.146). This measure is referred to as
the hot money method. Capital flight measured in this way refers to short-term
movements of capital, whereas the residual method additionally takes into
account capital outflows that are more long-term in nature.
Third, the capital flight measure proposed by Dooley (1986) also aims at
measuring abnormal or illegal capital outflows. Dooley defines capital flight as
all capital outflows based on the desire to place assets beyond the control of
domestic authorities, excluding normal outflows. Consequently, this measure
includes all capital outflows that do not receive and/or register interest payments.
However, Claessens and Naudé (1993, pp.5-7) show that the calculation of
capital flight as proposed by Dooley (1986) is in fact also at least partly based
on the residual approach, although he uses a different concept of capital flight.
Therefore, the Dooley method gives rather identical magnitudes of capital flight
as compared to those for the residual method.3 Table 1 shows the correlation
2 See Claessens and Naudé (1993) for a description of the measurement of capital flight
according to these variations of the residual method.
3 Still other measures have been proposed in the literature. In some studies, capital flight has
been measured by looking at trade misinvoicing. Proponents of this measure stress the fact that
abnormal capital outflows of residents may be included in export underinvoicing and/or import
3
matrix of the three capital flight measures and confirms the similarity between
the Morgan and Dooley measures.
<insert Table 1>
3. Magnitude of Capital Flight
Figure 1 presents the annual flow of capital flight for 84 developing countries
during the 1971-1991 period.4 The figure provides capital flight data according
to three methods of measurement: the Morgan Guaranty method, the hot money
method and the Dooley method. The Morgan Guaranty method is used here to
represent the residual method of measuring capital flight, since the most widely
used variation on this measure follows Morgan Guaranty (1986). The annual
flows measured according to the Morgan Guaranty and Dooley methods show
similar patterns. This may be expected, since as discussed in the previous
section, both methods - although conceptually different - measure capital flight
using the same data definitions. The annual flows measured according to the hot
money method differ in two respects from those based on the other two
methods. First, the flows based on the hot money method fluctuate less severely.
Second, hot money flows turn negative after 1985, whereas for the other
measures this is the case only after 1988. Nevertheless, the general trend of the
overinvoicing, since both these malpractices provide channels to siphon domestically accumulated
wealth outside the country (Gulati, 1987; Lessard and Williamson, 1987; Vos, 1990). However,
there are good reasons for not using trade misinvoicing as a measure of capital flight, since trade
misinvoicing may also occur as a reaction to the presence of trade taxes. Calculated trade
misinvoicing may therefore be unrelated to the phenomenon of capital flight (Gibson and
Tsakalotos, 1993, p.150). Other studies have taken the total stock of capital held outside the
country by non-bank residents as a measure of capital flight; this is the so-called asset method
(Hermes and Lensink, 1992). Yet, data for calculating the asset method are available only from
1981 onwards. For these reasons, both trade misinvoicing and the asset method are not taken into
account in this study.
4 The figure represents an aggregation of the magnitude of capital flight for the 84 sample
countries. It is assumed that there are no intercountry flows within this sample.
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flows for all the three measures presented in Figure 1 shows a similar pattern for
most of the 1971-1991 period.
<insert Figure 1>
4. Estimation Procedure and Results
The central hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that political risk stimulates
the magnitude of capital flight, controlling for macroeconomic and policy
variables. The role of political instability in explaining economic phenomena
such as differences in patterns of economic growth, inflation, investment, and
fiscal policy among countries has been investigated quite extensively during
recent years.5 Moreover, the relationship between political instability and
country risk - an issue closely related to the phenomenon of capital flight - has
been studied, albeit less extensively.6 This study is one of the very few that
investigates the relationship between political instability and capital flight.7
The data used in the estimations are taken from various sources. Data on
capital flight were taken from the World Bank data set (the 1993-94 version) on
capital flight. This data set, described in Claessens and Naudé (1993), provides
capital flight data for all developing countries for different measures during the
1971-1991 period. The political risk variables were taken from Barro and Lee
(1994), and from the so-called Polity III code book (available on internet; see
appendix I). Finally, the World Bank Economic Indicators disk, 1997, was used
for data on different macroeconomic and policy variables.
The existing literature on capital flight does not offer a consistent theoretical
5 See Siermann (1996) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on these issues.
6 Studies in this area are from Balkan (1992), Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), De Bondt and
Winder (1996) and De Haan, Siermann, and Van Lubek (1997).
7 To our knowledge only Pastor (1987) has included political instability variables in his
empirical investigation on the determinants of capital flight.
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framework for guiding our empirical work. No single model exists that
completely specifies the variables that may be held constant in order to
investigate the impact of political risk on capital flight. The most commonly
employed empirical procedure consists of running regressions of the following
form:
CF = α + β1 y1 + β2 y2 +....+ βn yn + µ (1)
where CF is the vector of capital flight, and y1...yn are different explanatory
variables. These explanatory variables vary across the different empirical
investigations available in the literature.
In order to investigate the impact of political variables on capital flight, we
use a procedure that follows the so-called Barro tradition that has been hitherto
used mainly in studies on endogenous growth (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sachs and
Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). Generally, the procedure consists of cross-
section regressions. To be able to treat political risk as the variable of interest,
and allow for testing the sensitivity of political variables to alterations in the
conditioning set of variables that have been mentioned in the literature to be
related to capital flight, we use a variant of Leamer’s extreme bounds analysis
(EBA) following Levine and Renelt (1992), as well as a (less strict) sensitivity
test suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997). Both these tests will be explained below.
First, however, the design of our empirical analysis is discussed in more detail.
In the analysis we use the following cross-section regression:
CF = αj + βij I + βmj M + βzj Z + µ (2)
where I is a set of variables always included in the regressions. M is a vector of
variables of interest. In our case, M is a set of political variables. Z is a vector of
domestic and international macroeconomic variables taken from the pool χ of N
variables identified by past studies as being potentially important explanatory
variables of capital flight. Appendix I presents a list of all variables used in the
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empirical analysis.
The dependent variable is the average capital flight to GDP ratio over the
1970-1990 period. The three different measures of capital flight - discussed in
Section 2 - have been used in the estimation.8 These three measures have been
used to show to what extent the measurement methodology may influence the
outcomes of the regression analysis. Average values of (dependent and
independent) variables over the whole period have been used in the estimation
since the political variables used are dummy variables showing relatively little
variation over time, which rules out time series analysis. As was already
mentioned above, many empirical studies in the Barro tradition have followed
the same estimation methodology of using average across years.
Next, the estimation procedure needs to be explained. First, we have to
decide on the vector of variables I. We take as I variables different capital
inflow variables, since most studies investigating the determinants of capital
flight have found that capital inflows are an important, robust determinant of the
phenomenon.9 Since different categories of capital inflows may affect capital
flight differently, we start by regressing capital flight on a set of capital inflow
variables in order to determine which capital inflow measures should be taken
into account. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 2. The table
shows that bank lending (BANK) is an important variable in explaining the
capital flight phenomenon. The variable appears with a positive and statistically
significant sign in all three capital flight equations. Inflows of development aid
(AID) appear to explain capital flight measured by both the Morgan Guaranty
and Dooley method. The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) was also
included in the regression analysis but was not found to be statistically
8 As discussed in Section 2, the different measures of capital flight reflect different concepts of
the phenomenon.
9 See Hermes and Lensink (1992) for an overview of these studies.
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significant.10 Based on the above set of estimates we include BANK and AID
in all other regressions with respect to the Morgan Guaranty and the Dooley
methods. BANK is used in the estimates regarding the hot money method. The
regressions including the capital inflow variables represent the basic model.
<insert Table 2>
As a second step in the estimation procedure, a number of variables proxying
political (in)stability and risk is selected to augment the basic model. These
variables represent the vector of variables of interest (M). The analysis includes
the following six political risk variables: a measure of political instability based
on the number of assassinations per million of population per year and the
number of revolutions per year (INSTAB); a dummy variable (from 1 to 7),
indicating the extent of political rights (RIGHTS); a dummy variable (from 1 to
7), indicating the extent of civil liberties (CIVIL); a dummy variable (from 0 to
10), representing the general openness of political institutions (DEMOC); a
dummy variable (from 0 to 5), representing the extent to which non-elites are
able to access institutional structures for political expression (PARCOM); and a
dummy variable (0 or 1) for countries that participated in at least one external
war during 1960-1985 (WAR).11 With respect to INSTAB, CIVIL and
RIGHTS, the higher the value of the dummy, the higher is the extent of political
instability in a particular country assumed to be. This means that for these three
10 In earlier regressions we also included bond and equity portfolio investments. These
variables appear to be insignificant for the Dooley and the Morgan Guarantee method. Bond
portfolio investment was significant for the Hot Money method. However, since many observations
for this variable were missing and since for many countries in our data set the value of Bond
portfolio investment equals zero, this variable has not been taken into account in this set of
regressions.
11 In an earlier set of regressions, we also tested the number of political coups in each year
(COUP). This variable appeared to be insignificant in all regressions and is therefore not
represented here.
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variables the relationship with capital flight should be positive. With respect to
DEMOC and PARCOM, the higher the value of the dummy, the more political
rights residents of a country have. Thus, for these two variables the relationship
with capital flight should be negative. Finally, the variable WAR is 0 if a
country did not participate in a war during the entire estimation period.
The use of INSTAB and WAR as variables to measure political instability
might be clear. They aim to measure directly the extent of political instability a
country has been confronted with, by focusing on issues such as the number of
revolutions, assassinations and war incidents. The variables CIVIL, RIGHTS,
DEMOC, and PARCOM indirectly measure political instability. These variables
focus on the existence (or absence) of political freedom, which can be seen as a
measure of the potential of the occurrence of political instability in a country.
The absence of political freedom is seen as an important source of the
occurrence of political instability.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the various political variables. As is
clear from the table, multicollinearity between some of these political risk
variables appears to be relatively high.
<insert Table 3>
Tables 4A-4C show the results of the estimations of adding the political risk
variables to the basic model one by one. The results show that all political risk
variables have a statistically significant effect on capital flight, measured by the
Dooley and the Morgan-Guaranty method. Moreover, the political variables have
the expected sign. With respect to the Hot Money method, only INSTAB and
PARCOM are significant. The results seem to strongly confirm the hypothesis
that political risk stimulates capital flight.
<insert Tables 4A-4C>
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The third step in the estimation procedure involves testing the robustness of the
results presented in Tables 4A-4C. This entails carrying out the robustness tests
suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). To begin with,
the estimations as presented in Tables 4A to 4C are extended by adding a group
of domestic and international macroeconomic variables to the regressions. The
selection of the set of domestic and international macroeconomic variables - the
Z variables - was made based on the existing empirical capital flight literature.
The following variables were used: the black market premium (BMP); the
standard deviation of inflation (STDINFL); the openness of a country (TRADE);
the budget deficit of the government to GDP ratio (BUDDEF); debt service as a
percentage of GDP (DEBTS); the inflation rate (INFL); the primary school
enrollment rate (PRENR); credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
(CREDITPR); the external debt to GDP ratio (DEBTGDP); the real interest rate
(RINTR); the standard deviation of the real interest rate (STDRINTR); the
interest rate spread, measured as the domestic lending rate minus the LIBOR
(SPREAD); the standard deviation of the spread (STDSPREAD); the deposit rate
(DEPR); the real GDP growth rate (GROWTH); per capita GDP (GDPPC); gross
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (INVEST); the ratio of money and
quasi money to GDP (MGDP); a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
(DUMA); a dummy for countries in Latin-America (DUMLA); a variable
measuring terms of trade shocks (TOT); and an additional measure of free trade
openness (DFREEOP).
Next, we estimate all possible regressions that can be specified by adding
any combination of four out of the 22 variables to the individual equations
presented in Tables 4A-4C. As was stated above, this procedure is based on the
idea that the empirical literature does not offer a consistent theoretical
framework for guiding our empirical work so that no single model exists that
completely specifies the variables that may be held constant in order to
investigate the impact of political risk on capital flight. The total number of
regressions estimated for every individual equation in Tables 4A-4C then is
7,315. Since we have six M-variables and three definitions of the dependent
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variable, performing the stability test involves estimating over 130,000
regressions.
We now come to explaining the robustness tests in more detail. The
procedure of the EBA suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) is as follows. For
each regression j, we find an estimate βmj and a standard deviation σmj for each
political variable m. The lower extreme bound is the lowest value of βmj - 2σmj,
whereas the upper bound is βmj + 2σmj. The extreme bounds test for variable M
involves the degree of confidence we accept on the partial correlations between
M and CF. If the upper extreme bound for M is positive and the lower extreme
bound is negative (i.e. the sign of the coefficient βmj changes), then variable M is
not robust. This means that alterations in the conditioning information set change
the statistical inferences on political risk and capital flight. Therefore, in case the
sign of the coefficient βmj switches when carrying out the EBA, the relationship
between capital flight and political risk variables is said to be fragile.
Tables 5A-5C present the results of the EBA. Quite disappointingly, it
appears that all political risk variables are fragile. Hence, the conclusion must be
that, based on this robustness test, the political risk variables do not have a
statistically robust relationship to capital flight, once we control for domestic and
international macroeconomic circumstances.
<insert Tables 5A-5C>
Sala-i-Martin (1997a) criticizes the EBA analysis of Levine and Renelt
(1992) for using too strict a robustness test and presents an alternative stability
analysis. We agree with his criticism of the EBA. Taking the EBA seriously
means that a relationship between two variables is already considered to be
fragile if just one regression out of many (7,315 in our case) is responsible for
the change in the sign of the coefficient.
Instead, the approach taken by Sala-i-Martin is based on looking at the entire
distribution of the coefficient β, instead of a zero-one (robust-fragile) decision,
11
and calculating the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on each
side of zero. By assuming that the distribution of the estimates of the
coefficients is normal and calculating the mean and the standard deviation of this
distribution, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated. His
methodology starts by computing the point-estimates of β and the standard
deviation σ. Next, the mean estimate of β and the average variance are
calculated as:12
The mean estimate of β and the average standard error are the mean and the
standard deviation of the assumed normal distribution. Finally, by using a table
for the (cumulative) normal distribution, it can be calculated which fraction of
the cumulative distribution function is on the right or left hand side of zero.
The CDFs have been calculated for all political risk variables for each of the
three different capital flight measures. The results of the robustness test are
presented in Tables 6A-6C. The column CDF denotes the largest fraction of the
cumulative distribution function, lying either on the right or left hand side of
zero. We use a standard significance level of 95 per cent to decide whether or
not a political risk variable is robustly related to one of the measures of capital
flight. The results of this more moderate robustness test show that CIVIL,
DEMOC and PARCOM have a significantly robust relationship with capital
flight, at least when it is measured in line with the Dooley and the Morgan
Guaranty method. RIGHTS and WAR are also robust for the Dooley method,
whereas their significance level is just below 95 per cent for the Morgan-
12 Sala-i-Martin uses a weigthed average with the likelihoods as weights. He shows that results
of his empirical analysis do not differ very much when an unweighted average is used.
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Guaranty method. The significance level is also just below 95 per cent for
INSTAB, both for the Morgan-Guaranty and Dooley method. When capital flight
is measured according to the Hot Money method, none of the political variables
have a statistically robust relationship to capital flight, at least when the 95 per
cent level of significance is used. INSTAB, DEMOC, and PARCOM are
significant at the 90 per cent significance level, whereas RIGHTS and WAR are
clearly insignificant. Notwithstanding these last results, the overall conclusion of
the analysis is that political variables have a significant, and in many cases a
statistically robust relationship to capital flight.13 14
<insert Tables 6A-6C>
5. Conclusions
The empirical analysis in this paper is the first serious attempt to examine the
relationship between political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing
countries. The outcomes of the analysis show that, no matter how capital flight
is defined conceptually and/or measured, political risk factors do matter in the
case were no other macro-economic variables are taken into account. Moreover,
in most cases (except when capital flight is measured according to the Hot
Money method) political risk variables do have a statistically robust relationship
to capital flight, once domestic and international macroeconomic circumstances
are added, at least when the robustness test as proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997)
is applied. When we apply the EBA proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992), no
13 Since, in principle, it is arbritrary to do the above described stability test using combinations
of four variables, we also did the stability test by including all combinations of three Z variables.
In this case the number of regressions for every political variable equals 1,540. The results of this
analysis are similar to the regressions carried out with combinations of four variables. The results
using combinations of three Z variables are available on request from the authors.
14 For completeness we also performed the robustness test as suggested by Sala-i-Martin
(1997) for the 22 Z variables used in our analysis. The results of the test are presented in
Appendix II.
13
robust relationship between political risk and capital flight can be found. Yet, we
agree with Sala-i-Martin that the EBA is a too strict test for the robustness of
relationships between variables. Therefore, we conclude that on the basis of the
analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political risk
leads to increased capital flight.
14
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TABLE 1: CORRELATION MATRIX; CAPITAL FLIGHT MEASURES
Hot Money Dooley Morgan
Hot Money 1.00
Dooley 0.66 1
Morgan 0.67 0.92 1
Note: The capital data have been calculated for the period 1971-1991. The data set used - including a
list of countries - in the analysis is available on request from the authors.
22
TABLE 2: THE BASIC MODEL; CAPITAL FLIGHT AND CAPITAL
INFLOWS

























adj. R2 0.14 0.15 0.16
observations 89 82 89
Mean Dep. Var. 1.57 0.14 1.25
S.D. Dep. Var. 3.75 1.69 4.67
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I
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TABLE 3: CORRELATION MATRIX; POLITICAL VARIABLES
INSTAB CIVIL RIGHTS DEMOC PARCOM WAR
INSTAB 1.00
CIVIL 0.20 1.00
RIGHTS 0.16 0.94 1.00
DEMOC -0.15 -0.85 -0.91 1.00
PARCOM -0.17 -0.89 -0.92 0.93 1.00
WAR 0.44 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1.00
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I
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TABLE 4A: MODEL EXTENSIONS WITH POLITICAL RISK
VARIABLES; MORGAN METHOD























































adj. R2 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.20
obs. 89 89 89 89 79 79 89
Mean DV 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.77 1.77 1.57
S.D. DV 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.78 3.79 3.75
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I
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TABLE 4B: MODEL EXTENSIONS WITH POLITICAL RISK
VARIABLES; HOT MONEY METHOD









































adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.15
obs. 86 86 86 86 77 77 86
Mean DV 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.12
S.D. DV 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I
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TABLE 4C: MODEL EXTENSIONS WITH POLITICAL RISK
VARIABLES; DOOLEY METHOD























































adj. R2 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.24
obs. 89 89 89 89 79 79 89
Mean DV 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.49 1.49 1.25
S.D. DV 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.68 4.68 4.67
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I
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TABLE 5A: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL VARIABLES USING EXTREME BOUND ANALYSIS;
MORGAN GUARANTY METHOD







DUMLA, GNPPC, DEBTS, PRENR







DUMA, STDSPREAD, RINTR, TRADE







DUMA, STDSPREAD, TOT, TRADE







DUMLA, DFREEOP, TRADE, DEBTGDP
DUMA, RINTR, GDPPC, TRADE fragile






DUMLA, DFREEOP, DEBTS, DEBTGDP







DUMA, TOT, TRADE, GROWTH
STDSPREAD, TRADE, MGDP, DEBTGDP fragile
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I. R2 is the adjusted R2.
TABLE 5B: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL VARIABLES USING EXTREME BOUND ANALYSIS;
DOOLEY METHOD







DUMLA, GDPPC, DEBTS, PRENR







DUMA, STDSPREAD, DUMLA, DEPR







DUMA, STDSPREAD, TOT, DEBTS







DUMLA, DFREEOP, TRADE, DEBTGDP







DUMLA, DFREEOP, DEBTS, DEBTGDP







DUMA, TOT, GDPPC, DEBTS
STDSPREAD, TRADE, MGDP, DEBTGDP fragile
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I. R2 is the adjusted R2.
TABLE 5C: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL VARIABLES USING EXTREME BOUND ANALYSIS;
HOT MONEY METHOD







DUMA, DFREEOP, TOT, PRENR







DUMA, DUMLA, STDSPREAD, GDPPC







DUMA, STDSPREAD, TOT, GDPPC







DFREEOP, TRADE, DUMLA, DEBTGDP







DFREEOP, BUDDEF, DEBTS, DEBTGDP







DFREEOP, DUMA, TOT, GDPPC
DUMA, STDSPREAD, TRADE, DEBTGDP fragile
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I. R2 is the adjusted R2.
TABLE 6A: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL
VARIABLES USING THE SALA-I-MARTIN ANALYSIS;
MORGAN GUARANTY METHOD
M variable mean β mean standard
error
R2 CDF robust/fragile*
INSTAB 3.64 2.321 0.18 0.941 fragile
CIVIL 0.48 0.276 0.19 0.959 robust
RIGHTS 0.16 0.237 0.18 0.946 fragile
DEMOC -0.19 0.117 0.16 0.952 robust
PARCOM -0.59 0.334 0.16 0.962 robust
WAR 1.18 0.719 0.16 0.950 robust
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I; R2 is the adjusted R2.
* at the 95 per cent significance level
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TABLE 6B: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL
VARIABLES USING THE SALA-I-MARTIN ANALYSIS;
DOOLEY METHOD
M variable mean β mean standard
error
R2 CDF robust/fragile*
INSTAB 4.74 2.952 0.20 0.946 fragile
CIVIL 0.71 0.346 0.22 0.973 robust
RIGHTS 0.56 0.298 0.22 0.971 robust
DEMOC -0.36 0.144 0.23 0.994 robust
PARCOM -1.08 0.409 0.23 0.996 robust
WAR 1.59 0.912 0.21 0.959 robust
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I; R2 is the adjusted R2.
* at the 95 per cent significance level
32
TABLE 6C: ROBUSTNESS TEST, RESULTS FOR POLITICAL
VARIABLES USING THE SALA-I-MARTIN ANALYSIS;
HOT MONEY METHOD
M variable mean β mean standard
error
R2 CDF robust/fragile*
INSTAB 1.57 1.139 0.14 0.915 fragile
CIVIL 0.17 0.139 0.14 0.893 fragile
RIGHTS 0.07 0.121 0.12 0.722 fragile
DEMOC -0.08 0.058 0.15 0.916 fragile
PARCOM -0.26 0.168 0.16 0.942 fragile
WAR 0.01 0.364 0.11 0.512 fragile
Notes: For list of variables, see Appendix I; R2 is the adjusted R2.
* at the 95 per cent significance level
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FIGURE 1: Annual flows of capital flight (US$ millions)
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Appendix I: List of variables
All data used in this study were taken from the World Bank Economic Indicators
disk, 1997, unless stated otherwise. All variables refer to averages for the 1970-
1990 period, unless stated otherwise.
Capital flows variables
BANK = bank and trade related lending as a percentage of GDP
FDI = foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
AID = development aid as a percentage of GNP
The I variables are BANK (for hot money) or BANK and AID (for Morgan
Guaranty and Dooley).
Political variables ( the M variables)
INSTAB = measure of political instability, calculated as 0.5 ASSASS +
0.5 REVOL, where ASSASS is the number of assassinations per
million population per year and REVOL is the number of
revolutions per year
RIGHTS = index of political rights (from 1 to 7; 1=most political rights)
CIVIL = index of civil liberties (from 1 to 7; 1=most civil liberties)
WAR = dummy variable giving a one to countries that participated in at
least one external war during the period 1960-1985, and a zero to
all other countries
DEMOC = general openness of political institutions (from 0 to 10; 0 = low)
PARCOM = extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures
for political expression (from 0 to 5; 0 = unregulated; 5 =
competitive)
INSTAB, RIGHTS, CIVIL and WAR are taken from the Barro-Lee data set
(available on the NBER Web-site). INSTAB is calculated over the 1970-1985
period. Originally, these data are from two different sources:
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- A.S. Banks, "Cross-National Time Series Data Archive," Center for Social
Analysis, State University of New York at Binghampton, September 1979,
updated (INSTAB and WAR); and
- R.D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, New York, Freedom House, various years
(RIGHTS and CIVIL).
DEMOC and PARCOM are taken from the POLITY III Code Book. Taken from
internet: fttp:/ isere.colorado.edu/pub/datasets/polity3/polity3.codebook.
Macroeconomic variables (the Z- variables)
BMP = black market premium, calculated as (black market
rate/official rate)-1. Data are taken from the Barro-Lee data
set
BUDDEF = overall budget deficits, including grants as a percentage of
GDP (positive figures are surpluses)
CREDITPR = credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
DEBTGDP = the external debt to GDP ratio
DEBTS = total debt service as a percentage of GDP
DEPR = the deposit rate (%)
DFREEOP = an measure of free trade openness from Barro-Lee data set.
Calculated as: DFREEOP = 0.528-0.026 log (AREA) - 0.095
log (DIST). AREA = size of land, million sqaures Km; DIST
= average distance to capitals of world 20 major exporters,
weighted by values of bilateral imports, 1000 Km.
DUMA = a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
DUMLA = a dummy for countries in Latin-America
GDPPC = per capita GDP
GROWTH = the real GDP growth rate
INFL = the annual inflation rate
INVEST = gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP
MGDP = the ratio of money and quasi money to GDP
PRENR = the primary school enrollment rate (%)
RINTR = the real interest rate (%)
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STDINFL = the standard deviation of the annual inflation rate, calculated
from the inflation figures
SPREAD = the interest rate spread, measured as the lending rate minus
the LIBOR
STDRINTR = the standard deviation of the real interest rate
STDSPREAD = the standard deviation of the spread
TOT = a variable measuring terms of trade shocks (growth rate of
export prices minus growth rate of import prices: taken from
Barro-Lee dataset. Variable is measured over 1970-1985
period)
TRADE = exports plus imports to GDP. This variable measures the
degree of openness
The data set used for this study - plus a full description of the methodology - are
available upon request from the authors.
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Appendix II: Robustness tests for the Z variables
This appendix presents robustness tests for the set of Z variables using the
Morgan Guaranty and the Hot Money method to estimate capital flight. The I
variables are the same as the one used in the analysis in the paper (i.e. BANK
and AIDGDP for the Morgan Guaranty method and BANK for the Hot Money
method). For each variable from the set of Z variables discussed in Appendix I
we applied the robustness tests described in the main text. The regressions
include - next to the I variables and the Z variable of interest - all other Z
variables used in our analysis of the robustness of the political variables.
Moreover, PARCOM and INSTAB are included as Z variables. We have not
included the other political variables to reduce the number of regressions. The
amount of regressions for each variable tested is 8,855. None of the variables are
robust according to the EBA analysis. Therefore, only the results of the method
suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997) are presented.
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TABLE II.1: SENSITIVITY RESULTS FOR MACRO VARIABLES.
MORGAN GUARANTY METHOD
M-variable R2 β standard error CDF
BUDDEF 0.20 -0.222 0.088 0.994
DEBTGDP 0.20 0.029 0.0138 0.983
DFREEOP 0.23 -9.261 6.379 0.926
GROWTH 0.18 -22.53 17. 54 0.900
DUMLA 0.17 -0.976 0.894 0.883
TOT 0.13 14.32 12.71 0.869
BMP 0.16 0.450 0.433 0.849
STDRINTR 0.16 0.041 0.040 0.843
GDPPC 0.16 0.361 0.378 0.831
INFL 0.17 0.004 0.006 0.761
RINTR 0.16 -0.020 0.032 0.732
DUMA 0.16 -0.419 0.857 0.684
TRADE 0.16 -0.0053 0.0129 0.659
CREDITPR 0.15 -0.009 0.030 0.614
PRENR 0.16 -0.005 0.018 0.606
SPREAD 0.17 -0.001 0.005 0.587
MGP 0.20 0.0046 0.021 0.583
STDINFL 0.17 0.0003 0.0017 0.575
INVEST 0.16 0.008 0.065 0.544
DEPR 0.17 0.0004 0.0084 0.519
STDSPREAD 0.17 0.0006 0.005 0.544
DEBTS 0.16 0.0038 0.139 0.508
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TABLE II.2: SENSITIVITY RESULTS FOR MACRO VARIABLES.
HOT MONEY METHOD
M-variable R2 β standard error CDF
GDPPC 0.19 0.442 0.184 0.992
TOT 0.17 11.35 6.03 0.970
STDINFL 0.17 0.0012 0.0008 0.932
DEBTGDP 0.15 0.009 0.0068 0.908
CREDITPR 0.12 0.015 0.014 0.856
INVEST 0.14 -0.031 0.030 0.851
GROWTH 0.13 -10.14 9.917 0.846
TRADE 0.13 -0.007 0.0069 0.826
INFL 0.16 0.002 0.003 0.785
BUDDEF 0.11 -0.032 0.048 0.749
DUMLA 0.13 0.235 0.432 0.705
DEBTS 0.13 -0.0075 0.0695 0.652
DEPR 0.13 -0.113 0.3311 0.633
DUMA 0.13 -0.135 0.411 0.629
MGP 0.11 -0.004 0.0127 0.618
STDSPREAD 0.13 0.0006 0.0023 0.603
STDRINTR 0.17 -0.971 3.636 0.602
PRENR 0.13 -0.002 0.008 0.591
DFREEOP 0.18 -0.829 3.656 0.587
RINTR 0.12 -0.001 0.015 0.528
SPREAD 0.12 -0.0001 0.002 0.520
BMP 0.12 0.001 0.200 0.500
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